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THE INCORPORATION OF THE REPUBLICAN
GUARANTEE CLAUSE
Jason Mazzone*
This Article makes the case for understanding the Fourteenth Amendment to
incorporate the Republican Guarantee Clause of Article IV. Incorporation shifts
the focus of the Guarantee Clause from the interests of states to the interests of
citizens; from protecting popular sovereignty as a political ideal to safeguarding
more specifically rights that citizens hold and exercise in a republican system. Once
incorporated, the Guarantee Clause should be understood to require states
themselves to maintain a republican form of government and to act to correct
departures from republicanism within their own governing arrangements. In
addition, an incorporated Guarantee Clause informs the meaning of rights protected
against state interference under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: safeguards
for privileges and immunities, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws,
are all usefully understood with an eye to republicanism. So, too, an incorporated
Guarantee Clause informs the meaning of provisions of the Bill of Rights when they
are applied to state governments. Incorporation also has implications for the
national government: its role shifts from a duty owed to the states to an obligation
to protect from state interference citizenship rights that serve republican ends.
Finally, incorporation alters the traditional assessment that Guarantee Clause
claims are nonjusticiable.
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INTRODUCTION
Reconstruction did not result in a new Constitution for the United
States. Instead, during Reconstruction, three amendments—the
Thirteenth, the Fourteenth, and the Fifteenth—were added to the
nation’s pre-existing Constitution. These three amendments worked
significant change, but, as mere amendments, they left in place most
of what was already in the document. Accordingly, understanding the
meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments, and, more generally, of
the Constitution after Reconstruction, requires attention to the entire
document, as amended. In other words, to make sense of what Reconstruction brought means starting with the Constitution’s Preamble and
reading forward to the Reconstruction-era Amendments—and then, as
necessary, going back again to the beginning—rather than focusing
solely on the three amendments themselves. Taking that approach,
this Article advances a single claim: that the Fourteenth Amendment
should be understood to incorporate the Republican Guarantee
Clause of Article IV.1 The Article was prepared for a symposium to
mark the publication of The Reconstruction Amendments: The Essential
Documents, a collection of materials curated and edited by Professor
Kurt Lash. The Article draws heavily on the materials in that collection
to set forth some historical evidence for an incorporated account of
the Republican Guarantee Clause. Given the constraints of the
symposium format, the evidence presented is illustrative rather than
exhaustive: more work will be needed to complete the historical
record. The Article also explores, again in a preliminary fashion, some
implications that emerge from understanding the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate the Republican Guarantee Clause.
Incorporation, the Article suggests, shifts the focus of the Republican
Guarantee Clause from the interests of states as states to the interests
of citizens, from broad concepts of popular sovereignty to protecting
more specifically rights that citizens hold and exercise in a republican

1 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (providing that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government”).
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system. The incorporated Republican Guarantee Clause should be
understood to require states themselves to maintain a republican form
of government—as an obligation that states owe to their own citizens
and to the citizenry of the nation as a whole—and to act to correct
departures from republicanism in their own governing arrangements.
The Republican Guarantee Clause also informs the meaning of rights
protected against state interference in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment: safeguards for privileges and immunities, due process of
law, and equal protection of the laws, are all usefully understood with
an eye to republicanism. So, too, the Republican Guarantee Clause
informs the meaning of provisions of the Bill of Rights when, through
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, they are applied against state
governments. As to the national government, it has an obligation to
protect citizenship rights that serve republican ends from state
interference. Finally, the shift from forms of government to citizens’
rights should alter the traditional assessment that claims under the
Republican Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable.
Part I presents some historical evidence for understanding the
Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Republican Guarantee
Clause. Part II identifies some implications that flow from the incorporated account. Part III takes a fresh look at Justice Harlan’s dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson and suggests that it reflects something quite close to
the account presented here of the relationship between the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Republican Guarantee Clause. A
brief conclusion points to some areas of future research.
I.

REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT

This Part draws on historical materials—particularly
congressional debates—to trace the role of the Guarantee Clause in
the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
discussion begins, as the Thirty-Ninth Congress itself began, not with
rights but with the question of apportionment: the allocation of House
seats after the end of slavery, in the urgent context in which, if the
Constitution’s original apportionment formula in Article I was left
intact, the former slave states stood to gain representation in Congress
even as they treated freed slaves as outside of the political community.
In the various efforts, culminating in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to change the Constitution’s apportionment formula,
republican government provided a backdrop commitment, a common
benchmark for discussion and debate. In this process, there emerged,
necessarily, competing accounts of what republicanism in practice
meant. As this Part shows, republicanism, debated in the apportionment context, took on sharpened form in the drafting and ratification
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of the rights-protecting provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and of Congress’s enforcement power in Section 5.
A. Apportionment
With the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the former
slave states stood to increase their representation in the House because
there was no longer a slave population subject to the three-fifths
discount of Article I of the original Constitution.2 Further, this
increase in state representation would be based on a population—
newly freed slaves—the former slave states treated as outside the
political community and lacking in political rights. In the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, Representative Roscoe Conkling (Republican of New York)
described the problem as follows:
Four million people are suddenly among us not bound to any one,
and yet not clothed with any political rights. They are not slaves,
but they are not, in a political sense, “persons.”
....
This emancipated multitude has no political status.
...
. . . The three-fifths rule gave the slaveholding States over and
above their just representation, eighteen Representatives beside, by
the enumeration of 1860. The new situation will enable those
States when relationships are resumed, to claim twenty-eight
Representatives beside their just proportion. Twenty-eight votes to
be cast here and in the Electoral College for those held not fit to sit
as jurors, not fit to testify in court, not fit to be plaintiff in a suit, not
fit to approach the ballot box. Twenty-eight votes, to be more or
less controlled by those who once betrayed the Government, and
for those so destitute, we are assured, of intelligent instinct as not
to be fit for free agency. 3

1. A Single Amendment Penalizing Racial Discrimination
Efforts in Congress to amend the Constitution to alter the original
Article I apportionment formula in light of the end to slavery began in
1865. In December of that year, three members of the House offered
separate proposals to base apportionment not on each state’s total

2 See id. art. I, § 2 (providing for an apportionment of representatives based on state
population, determined by adding to “the whole Number of free Persons . . . three fifths of
all other Persons”).
3 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 351, 353–59 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Conkling), as reprinted in 2 THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE ESSENTIAL
DOCUMENTS 43, 45–46 (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021) [hereinafter LASH, Vol. 2].
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population—the source of boosted power for the former slave states—
but on the number of eligible voters within each state.4 The newly free
population would thus count only if also enfranchised. These three
proposals were referred to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
which, in January 1866, offered, as a Joint Resolution, its own
apportionment amendment by which representation would be based
upon a state’s entire population (excluding Indians) with the
limitation that “whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or
abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons therein
of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of
representation.”5 In other words, under the Committee’s approach, if
a state denied anybody the right to vote on the basis of that person’s
race, everybody of the same race would be excluded from the
population count that determined the state’s number of House seats.
Defending the proposal, Committee co-chair Thaddeus Stevens
(Republican of Pennsylvania) announced that the amendment was
needed in order to align the Constitution with the principles of the
Declaration of Independence, which, he said provided the
“intended . . . foundation of our Government.”6 According to Stevens:
If . . . [our fathers] had been able to base their Constitution on the
principles of that Declaration it would have needed no amendment
during all time, for every human being would have had his rights;
every human being would have been equal before the law; and no
oppression could have been effected except through usurpation
against the principles of that Government.7

Slavery, however, “precluded” the Founders “from carrying out
their own principles into the organic law of this Union” and thus the
Founders had to “compromise[] their principles for what they deemed
a greater good.”8 With slavery now ended, Stevens announced, “[t]he
time has come when we can make the Constitution what our fathers
desired to make it.”9
4 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1865) (proposal by Rep. Schenck for an
amendment “to apportion Representatives according to the number of voters in the several
States”); id. at 10 (proposal by Rep. Stevens for an amendment providing that
“[r]epresentatives shall be apportioned among the States . . . according to their respective
legal voters; and for this purpose none shall be named as legal voters who are not either
natural-born citizens or naturalized foreigners”); id. (proposal by Rep. Broomall for an
amendment “so as to base the representation in Congress upon the number of electors,
instead of the population, of the several States”).
5 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1275, 1281–89 (1866), as reprinted in LASH, Vol.
2, supra note 3, at 133, 135.
6 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 536 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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Stevens’s invocation of foundational principles set the stage for
the debate over the Committee’s proposal. Much of the ensuing
discussion in Congress centered on the compatibility of the proposed
amendment with the Republican Guarantee Clause—which was
treated as encapsulating an unbreachable constitutional commitment.
Radical Republicans who opposed the amendment argued that—
besides the fact it did not mandate black suffrage—if added to the
Constitution it would imply that states actually had power to deny
voting rights to a portion of the population so long as they were willing
to assume the specified penalty. Such power, opponents urged, was
inconsistent with republican government. Thus, Representative
William Higby (Republican of California) said the proposed
amendment “directly conflicts” with and “may as well blot out” the
Constitution’s Republican Guarantee Clause because, he claimed, it
would permit a state “by implication . . . to exclude a whole class on
account of race or color” from the franchise.10 Senator Charles
Sumner (Republican of Massachusetts) said that because the proposal
was incompatible with the Guarantee Clause, if ratified, it would
introduce “discord and defilement” into the Constitution.11 Sumner
argued that because it made no mention of slavery, the text of the
original Constitution “was kept blameless” but the Joint Committee
now “proposed to admit in the Constitution the twin idea [to slavery]
of Inequality in Rights” in a way that would “openly set at naught the
first principles of the Declaration of Independence and the guarantee
of a republican government itself.”12 For Sumner, if the proposed
amendment were adopted, the Constitution, by authorizing denial of
the franchise, would sanction, as compatible with the core
commitment to republicanism, a “bare-faced tyranny of taxation
without representation.”13
Notions that the original Constitution was pure, or that the
Framers’ own aspirations were pure even if the Constitution they
adopted was not, were common in the Reconstruction era. As to
republicanism itself, there is a vast literature exploring how the
founding generation understood the term.14 In a very general sense,

10 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 422–35 (1866) (statement of Rep. Higby), as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 55, 56.
11 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 673–74 (1866) (statement of Sen. Sumner), as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 90, 91.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (2015); DANA D. NELSON, COMMONS DEMOCRACY: READING THE POLITICS OF
PARTICIPATION IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES (2016); M.N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN
REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1994); SUSAN
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for the founding generation, republican government meant rule by
the people and thus was distinguished from monarchy or aristocracy.15
James Madison identified a further element of republicanism: majority
rule.16 But that left unanswered the question of who within the
governed population counted for purposes of determining whether a
majority was exercising power. Madison also famously distinguished a
republic from a democracy (or what he often called a pure
democracy). In both of those systems, the people are sovereign. In a
(pure) democracy, individual citizens themselves exercise governmental power, directly. In a republic, by contrast, governmental power is
exercised by representatives.17 This distinction between republicanism
and democracy should not, however, obscure the basic similarity
between the two—popular sovereignty—and their shared distinction,
to the founding generation, from monarchical and aristocratic
systems. In any event, when Stevens, Higby, and Sumner (and, as we
shall soon see, many others) invoked republicanism, they were
incontestably right about the form of government the founding
generation revered. The challenge was determining the meaning of
republicanism, in practice, and in the context of amending the
Constitution to correct failures that had produced a Civil War, and to
unify anew the nation.
If Radical Republicans were correct about the implication of the
proposed apportionment amendment for the meaning of
republicanism, there was also an implication for the federal
government’s constitutional obligation (and power) to “guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”18
Sumner thought the amendment would largely nullify the ability of the
federal government—he focused on Congress—to intervene to ensure
republican government in the states. He said:
I denounce the proposition as positively tying the hands of Congress
in its interpretation of a Republican Government, so that under the

FORD WILTSHIRE, GREECE, ROME, AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1992); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969).
15 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 193 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(defining a republic as “a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior” and distinguishing republican
government from monarchies and aristocracies).
16 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 50 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(describing majority rule as “the republican principle”).
17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 67 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“[I]n a
democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they
assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently,
will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.”).
18 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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guarantee clause it must recognize an Oligarchy, Aristocracy, Caste
and Monopoly, founded on color, with the tyranny of taxation
without representation as republican in character, which I insist
they are not. At present the hands of Congress are not tied.
Congress is free to act generously, nobly, truly, according to the
highest idea of a republic, discountenancing all inequality of rights
and the tyranny of taxation without representation. Let the
pending proposition find a place in the Constitution, and the
guarantee clause will be restrained in its operation. . . . In other
words, the denial or abridgment of the elective franchise on
account of race or color, and the tyranny of taxation without
representation will be recognized in the Constitution as republican
in character.19

As Sumner’s comments suggest, denial of voting rights to black
citizens was not the only concern the proposed amendment triggered.
Rather, opponents took the view that the amendment would enshrine
in the Constitution a more general notion that states could deny voting
to any classes of their citizens they wished and still claim to be
republican in nature. Race, in other words, was just one incantation
of what would be constitutionalized as broad state power over voting,
with the federal government unable to invoke the Guarantee Clause as
a basis to intervene. Representative Thomas Eliot (Republican of
Massachusetts) argued:
[T]he amendment . . . enables a State, consistently with its
provisions, by making the right to vote depend upon a property
qualification, to exclude large classes of men of both races. . . .
Yet . . . under the Constitution Congress is bound to see to it that
each State shall have a republican form of government.
. . . [T]his amendment . . . controls by implication that power,
because, while the Constitution now says that Congress shall
guaranty to every State a republican form of government, this
amendment as reported by the committee admits by implication
that, although a State may so legislate as to exclude these
multitudes of men, not on account of race or color, but on account
of property, yet, nevertheless, she would have a republican form of
government, and that Congress will not and ought not to
interfere.20

On this assessment, the proposed amendment, although designed
to promote political membership, would end up narrowing the classes

19 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1224–28 (1866) (statement of Sen. Sumner),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 126, 127 (alteration in original).
20 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 403–07 (1866) (statement of Rep. Eliot), as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 53, 54.
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that hold political power at the state level—and leave the federal
government powerless to respond.
From a different perspective, some congressional Democrats
argued that because states already had power to allocate the franchise
however they saw fit, the problem with the amendment was that it
would penalize states for exercising that power in certain ways.
Representative Andrew Rogers (Democrat from New Jersey)
complained that by imposing a reduction in representation in
Congress, the proposed amendment departed from “one of the
fundamental principles . . . laid down by our fathers at the formation
of the Constitution as an axiom of civil and political liberty, that
taxation and representation should always go together.”21 According
to Rogers, the penalty provision improperly introduced a suffragebased element to representation. Rogers complained that the
provision “inflicts upon the States a penalty for refusing to the colored
population an unqualified right of suffrage which it does not inflict
upon them for refusing the same thing to the white population” and
thus compels the states, if they are to enjoy “their rights [of full
representation] under the present organic law” to extend the
franchise to black citizens.22 In Rogers’s view, republicanism was
necessarily compatible with restrictions on voting given historical and
contemporary practices: “[e]very man in this House knows perfectly
well in the several States a person under the age of twenty-one years
cannot vote, unnaturalized citizens cannot vote, and the whole class of
females, constituting nearly one half of the population of this country,
cannot vote; yet for these persons the States are entitled to
representation.”23
Members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who invoked the
Guarantee Clause during their consideration of the apportionment
amendment often depicted the Clause as itself requiring states to
maintain a republican government. In other words, they understood
republicanism not just as something the federal government was
obligated to protect but as a requirement that states themselves had to
follow. For example, Samuel Shellabarger (Republican of Ohio),
observing that the proposed amendment “might be construed to give

21 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 351, 353–59 (1866) (statement of Rep. Rogers),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 43, 44.
22 Id. Rogers’s account of the proposed amendment was inaccurate. His claim that it
required extending to black citizens “an unqualified right of suffrage” was wrong because
the penalty provision would be triggered only when denial of the franchise is based on race
or color. Rogers also erred in asserting that states could freely deny the franchise to white
citizens without penalty: if such denials were based on race, the same penalty provision
would apply.
23 Id. at 44–45.
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powers to the States regulating the matter of the elective franchise,
which they did not even now possess, in the way of excluding an entire
race from the right of the elective franchise,” described the Guarantee
Clause as a direct constraint upon the states themselves: “As our
Constitution now is,” Shellabarger said, “we have at least this restraint
on the power of the States, to wit, that they cannot so limit that
franchise that the State shall cease to be republican, cease to be based
upon the voice of the people.”24 By altering the meaning of
republicanism, Shellabarger argued, “[t]his authorization of the
disenfranchisement of race being introduced into the Constitution
might be held to modify the present sense of the clause relating to the
States being republican, and might thus tend to lessen the power of
the people.”25 On this understanding, the Guarantee Clause contains
more than an obligation the federal government owes to the states: it
also imposes an obligation on the part of the states, to their own
citizens, to maintain republican government.
Supporters of the apportionment amendment denied it had
implications for the meaning of republican government because, they
said, the amendment did not imply a power on the part of states to
limit the franchise—and instead punished them for doing so. One
form of this argument rejected outright any constitutional power on
the part of the states to limit voting and asserted that punishment does
not imply power. John Bingham (Republican of Ohio), for example,
argued that “a grant of power by implication cannot be raised by a law
which only imposes a penalty, and nothing but a penalty, for the
nonperformance of a duty or the violation of a right.”26 Bingham
invoked common-law approaches to support his point:
Within the last hundred years, in no country where the common
law obtains, I venture to say, has any implication of a grant of power
ever been held to be raised by such a law, and especially an implied
power, to do an act expressly prohibited by the same law.27

Invoking both Article I, Section 2 (which he described as itself a
guarantee) and the Republican Guarantee Clause, Bingham argued
that the amendment provision rightly penalized states that violated
republican requirements in the allocation of political power. It is
worth quoting Bingham at length:
[T]he words of the Constitution [in Article I, Section 2], the people
of “the States shall choose their Representatives,” is an express

24 Id. at 46 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
25 Id.
26 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 422–35 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 55, 63.
27 Id.
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guarantee that a majority of the free male citizens of the United
States in every State of this Union, being of full age, shall have the
political power subject to the equal right of suffrage in the minority
of free male citizens of full age. There is a further guarantee in the
Constitution, of a republican form of government to every State,
which I take to mean that the majority of the free male citizens in
every State shall have the political power. I submit . . . that this
proviso [i.e., the apportionment amendment] is nothing but a
penalty for a violation on the part of the people of any State of the
political right of franchise guarantied by the Constitution to their
free male fellow-citizens of full age.
....
. . . [T]he proviso is a penalty, and nothing but a penalty,
inflicted on the State if its ruling class disregard and violate the
guarantees of the Constitution of the political right of all the free
people therein, being male citizens of the United States of full age,
to participate in the choice of electors, by imposing on any part of
one class special disabilities not imposed on the other class.
The guarantee in the first article of the second section of the
Constitution rightly interpreted is, as I claim, this, that the majority
of the male citizens of the United States of full age in each State
shall forever exercise the political power of the State with this
limitation, that they shall never by caste legislation impose
disabilities upon one class of free male citizens to the denial or
abridgment of equal rights. The further provision is that the
United States shall guaranty to each State a republican form of
government, which means that the majority of male citizens of full
age in each State shall govern, not, however, in violation of the
Constitution of the United States or of the rights of the minority.
....
. . . [The proposed amendment] says in terms that if any of the
States of the United States shall disobey the Constitution; that if
they shall make distinctions in violation of the second section of the
first article of the Constitution, that as a penalty such State shall lose
political power in this House, to the extent of the whole class or
race against any part of whom the unjust discrimination has been
made.28

Two points here bear emphasis. One is Bingham’s understanding
of republicanism as governmental power exercised according to the
will of the majority of (male) citizens, but only in a system where the
minority of (male) citizens, because of a requirement of an equal right
to vote, also has an opportunity to participate and shape outcomes.
The second point is Bingham’s understanding of the Republican
28

Id. at 64.
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Guarantee Clause as directed not at (or not only at) the interests of the
state, but as a protection for the (male) citizens of the state as the
rightful holders of political power. On this account, republicanism
sounds not in political structure but in rights; and it sounds in the
rights of classes of citizens not (or at least not only) the rights of
individuals.
Other members of Congress who took the view that states already
had power to limit the franchise contended that the proposed
amendment did not alter—either by adding to or subtracting from—
that pre-existing authority. Thaddeus Stevens, for example, argued
that “no good philologist who, upon reading this proposed
amendment, will for a single moment pretend that it either grants a
privilege or takes away a privilege from any State.”29 Rather, Stevens
said, the amendment “punish[es] the abuse of that privilege if it
exists.”30 Stevens was treading a fine line. He claimed that “the States
have the right, and always have had it, to fix the elective franchise
within their own States” and thus the amendment “grants no right.”31
At the same time, according to Stevens, the amendment does not “take
it [the pre-existing right] from them [the states]”32 because the penalty
provision is not itself a deprivation of power. Instead, Stevens argued,
the penalty
says . . . to the State of South Carolina and other slave States, true,
we leave where it has been left for eighty years the right to fix the
elective franchise, but you must not abuse it; if you do, the
Constitution will impose upon you a penalty . . . .
....
. . . [N]o more strong inducement could ever be held out to
them, no more severe punishment could ever be inflicted upon
them as States. If they exclude the colored population they will lose
at least thirty-five Representatives in this Hall. If they adopt it they
will have eighty-three votes.33

29 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 535–38 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens), as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 80, 81.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 351, 353–59 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Conkling), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 43, 46 (“If there is an
implication [of state power], and if there is a recognition, or even an authorization . . . do
we not see, at least, that nothing more is suggested than has always been permitted with
universal acquiescence by the courts and the nation? The right to exclude class has been
construed into the Constitution or in spite of the Constitution already, and all the restraint
we now have would remain, I think.”).
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On this account, the amendment’s penalty does not alter state
power because the penalty is triggered only for abuses of power and
because inducements to act in certain ways do not undermine power
held.
2. The Section 2 Formula
Although the proposed single apportionment amendment, with
its penalty for race-based discrimination in voting, failed, Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment alters the Article I basis for
representation. In place of “adding to the whole Number of free
Persons”34 in a state, three-fifths of the state’s slave population, the
Fourteenth Amendment requires, with slavery abolished, counting
“the whole number of persons in each State” (excluding, as under the
original Constitution, “Indians not taxed”).35 But there is also a
penalty: if the right of any adult male citizens to vote is “denied . . . or
in any way abridged,” except on the basis of “participation in rebellion,
or other crime,” then the state’s representation is reduced
proportionately.36 Section 2 says nothing of race; its penalty provision
is triggered when states abridge voting rights of any adult (male)
citizens, not just on the basis of race. But the provision had a racial
origin: it incentivized states to extend to black citizens the same voting
rights enjoyed by white citizens,37 and it ensured that the former slave
states would not gain an increase in representation on the basis of
newly freed slaves denied the franchise.38
Congress’s earlier consideration of a single apportionment
amendment had already aired arguments about voting, republicanism,
and state power over the franchise. Jacob Howard’s (Republican of
Michigan) speech introducing the proposed Fourteenth Amendment
in the Senate navigated these earlier debates. Howard said that the
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
35 Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–67 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 185, 191 (explaining that “this
amendment is so drawn as to make it the political interest of the once slaveholding States
to admit their colored population to the right of suffrage” because “[t]he penalty of
refusing will be severe” and noting that the penalty is not limited to former slave states
because it applies “to all States without distinction” if they restrict voting on the basis of
race).
38 See, e.g., id. at 190 (reporting that if the original Article I formula remained, the
former slave states would immediately gain nine or ten congressional seats, and asking:
“Shall the recently slaveholding States, while they exclude from the ballot the whole of their
black population, be entitled to include the whole of that population in the basis of their
representation, and thus to obtain an advantage which they did not possess before the
rebellion and emancipation?”).

1448

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:4

proposed Fourteenth Amendment did not require equality in voting.
Section 1, he observed, defined citizenship and protected certain
rights against state infringement, but it did not reach the right to
vote—a political right beyond the scope of Section 1’s protections.
Howard explained:
The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or
immunities . . . secured by the Constitution. It is merely the
creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the
result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those
fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and without
which a people cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a
despotism.39

Echoing arguments made about the prior (rejected)
apportionment amendment, Howard contended that Section 2 of the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment also did not affect state power over
the franchise. While Section 2 penalized denial of the franchise to
adult male citizens, Howard insisted that it did not thereby require
states to extend the franchise to black citizens—or authorize the
federal government, via the Guarantee Clause, to intervene to require
states to extend voting rights.40 Howard himself thought that from the
perspective of republican government the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment fell short precisely because it did not prohibit states from
denying the franchise on the basis of race.41 However, he recognized,
ratification of an amendment with such a prohibition was politically
impossible.42 Other Republicans opposed the amendment, just as they
had opposed its predecessor, because it did not make suffrage
universal and, as with the prior apportionment amendment, seemed
to recognize as a constitutional matter the power of states to deny
voting on the basis of race and on other grounds.43

39 Id. at 188.
40 Id. at 189 (“[T]his section of the amendment does not recognize the authority of
the United States over the question of suffrage in the several States at all; nor does it
recognize, much less secure, the right of suffrage to the colored race.”).
41 Id. (“[I]f I could have my own way, if my preferences could be carried out, I
certainly should secure suffrage to the colored race to some extent at least; for I am opposed
to the exclusion and proscription of an entire race.”).
42 Id. at 189–90 (“It was our [committee’s] opinion that three fourths of the States of
this Union could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage, even in any degree
or under any restriction, to the colored race. . . . The second section [therefore] leaves the
right to regulate the elective franchise still with the States, and does not meddle with that
right.”).
43 See, e.g., Frederick Douglass, An Appeal to Congress for Impartial Suffrage, 19 ATL.
MONTHLY, Jan. 1867, at 112–17, as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 323, 327 (urging
the Thirty-Ninth Congress to enfranchise black citizens).
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Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment did not resolve
questions about the scope of state power, in a republican system, to
allocate the franchise. Nonetheless, ratification at least made clear
that denial of voting rights to certain classes of (male) citizens was
sufficiently problematic to republican government that a federally
imposed penalty should result. Whether or not past state limitations
on the franchise were compatible with earlier notions of republican
government, going forward, republicanism at least put a thumb on the
scale against such limitations.
So far, the discussion has focused on Congress. Attention to the
ratification process at the state level sheds additional light on the
relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Republican
Guarantee Clause. Of particular note is the extraordinary analysis by
Indiana Governor Oliver Morton in his January 11, 1867, message
urging the state legislature to ratify the amendment.44 Morton teed up
his discussion of the Guarantee Clause by contemplating the possibility
that the former Confederate states refuse to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment and continue their “reign of terror” and “flagrant
disregard of liberty and life.”45 Morton argued that a failure by the
former Confederate states to ratify the amendment, and thereby
“abandon their sins,”46 would trigger the federal government’s power
under the Guarantee Clause—and do so in a particular way. In the
context of rebellion, Morton argued, that power could be used to
regulate voting rights in the former Confederate states even though in
ordinary circumstances states themselves control the franchise.47
Morton explained that the Guarantee Clause permits the national
government to “interfere in a certain contingency, with the
government of a State.”48 While, he said, “the extent of this power . . .
has never been settled by any precedent,” it must be understood as “a
vast undefined power, given to the United States to guard the States
against revolution, anarchy or change to monarchical or aristocratic
government” such that, “[i]f a State government has been destroyed
by rebellion, the United States must set up or re-establish a republican
form of government.”49
Morton emphasized that the Constitution itself does not “mark[]
out” how reestablishment of republican government is to occur, and

44 Oliver P. Morton, Ind. Governor, Governor’s Message (Jan. 11, 1867), in 1 IND.
HOUSE J. 21 (1867), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 349, 349–52.
45 Id. at 351.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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instead leaves the matter to “the circumstances of each case.”50
Adopting a McCulloch-style51 approach to federal power, Morton
contended that “the measure of power must . . . be the extent of the
means necessary to accomplish the purpose” because “[i]t is a well
recognised principle of Constitutional law, that where a duty is
enjoined, all the powers necessary to the performance of the duty are
included” and thus in re-establishing republican government the
United States “must be held to have the right to employ whatever
instrumentalities are necessary for that purpose.”52
As for voting, Morton said: “Ordinarily, and when the country is
in a normal condition, the subject of suffrage is in the control
absolutely of the several States, and has been so treated from the first
formation of the Government, and may be regarded clearly as one of
the reserved rights of the States.”53 However, in Morton’s view, the
calculation changes when the conditions of state government trigger
the guarantee obligation:
[I]f a State government shall fall into anarchy, or be destroyed by
rebellion, and it is found clearly and unmistakably, that a loyal new
one can not be erected and successfully maintained without
conferring upon a race or body of men the right of suffrage, to
whom it has been denied by the laws of the State, it would clearly
be within the power of Congress to confer it for that purpose, upon
the principle that it can employ the means necessary to the
performance of a required duty.
....
If, when other remedies have failed, it be the clear and
deliberate judgment of Congress that loyal Republican State
governments can not be maintained except by conferring the
elective franchise upon the negro race in those States, Congress
may confer it upon the ground that it is necessary to the
performance of a prescribed duty.54

In other words, the federal government is entitled to determine
that extension of the franchise is necessary to restore republican
government within a state and thereby displace the state’s ordinary
control over voting rights.
Morton’s intriguing approach provided for a potential use of the
Guarantee Clause—tied to the Fourteenth Amendment—to regulate
voting in the former slave states, particularly by extending rights to
black citizens, while avoiding the conclusion that universal suffrage is
50
51
52
53
54

Id.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Morton, supra note 44, at 351.
Id.
Id. at 351–52.
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necessarily a requirement of republican government so that loyal states
would be subjected to similar interventions.
In justifying his approach, Morton offered a baseline account of
republicanism in which, reflective of natural rights, there exists
universal suffrage. He said:
As a political question, our Republican theory, which asserts that
“government exists only by the consent of the governed,” and that
“taxation and representation” should go together, does not admit
that suffrage shall be limited by race, caste, or color. As a question
of natural right, it is hard to say that suffrage is not a natural right,
when upon its exercise may depend the possession and enjoyment
of all other acknowledged natural rights. It is hard to say that a man
has a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and yet has
no natural right to a voice in that government by which these other
rights will be protected or denied. 55

At the same time, Morton argued, in some circumstances
restrictions on suffrage could be consistent with republicanism and
natural rights because “all . . . natural rights are subject to restriction
and limitation for the general welfare of society.”56 That is, a sufficient
justification could displace ordinary republican requirements of
universal suffrage. As to race-based voting distinctions specifically,
Morton said:
The proposition at once to introduce to the ballot-box half a
million of men, who but yesterday were slaves, the great mass of
whom are profoundly ignorant, and all impressed with that
character which slavery impresses upon its victims, is repugnant to
the feelings of a large part of our people, and would only be
justified by necessity resulting from inability to maintain loyal
republican State governments without them.
But the necessity for loyal Republican State Governments that
shall protect men of all races, classes and opinions, and shall render
allegiance and support to the Government of the United States,
must override every other consideration of prejudice or policy. 57

In other words, Morton saw a sufficient basis for states to withhold
the franchise from newly freed slaves (he said nothing about the free
black population): that freed slaves lacked educational (and perhaps
other) qualities necessary to evaluate electoral options and
meaningfully cast a ballot. Nonetheless, the state power to restrict the
franchise, and the justification for its use, could be displaced if the
federal government determined that extension of suffrage was

55
56
57

Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
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necessary to restore republicanism. Whatever the merits of Morton’s
approach, significantly, it, too, reflects the idea that race-based—and
other class-based—voting distinctions are at least problematic in a
republican system. Such distinctions are permissible, perhaps, but not
automatically so.
3. Statutory Implementation
After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment there were
additional debates over its implications—once it is coupled with the
Guarantee Clause—for voting rights. In January of 1869, the House
took up consideration of a bill along with a proposed amendment—it
would become the Fifteenth—to bar states from denying the vote on
the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The bill’s
sponsor, George Boutwell (Republican of Massachusetts), argued that
the Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment provided
congressional authority for the legislation. Boutwell invoked the
statement in Federalist 43, that “[i]n a confederacy founded upon
republican principles . . . the superintending Government ought
clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic
and monarchical measures,”58 and James Wilson’s assertion at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention that “[t]he right of suffrage is
fundamental to republics,”59 to argue that the Guarantee Clause
empowers the federal government to remedy race-based (and other)
restrictions on the franchise—as aristocratic and therefore unrepublican. Boutwell explained:
The essence of an aristocracy is . . . that the Government is in
certain families made hereditary to the exclusion of others. . . . You
may limit this aristocracy to twelve men, you may enlarge it to a
hundred, to a thousand, or to ten thousand; but if limited, if certain
persons are included and certain others excluded, not for
themselves merely but for all their posterity, you have an
aristocracy. There is, I submit to this House, no other possible
definition of an aristocracy; there is no other possible honest
distinction between an aristocratic and a republican form of
government.60

58 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 555–61 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell), as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 447, 454. Boutwell attributes Federalist No. 43 to
Hamilton, though Madison was the author.
59 Id. For Wilson’s statement, see THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 482 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
60 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 555–61 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell), as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 447, 454.
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On this account, because race is hereditary, distinctions based on
race are equivalent to the hereditary workings of an aristocracy.
Boutwell also argued that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment was a basis for federal intervention to correct race-based
voting restrictions. In his view, Section 1’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause bars states from denying to black citizens the right to vote
enjoyed by white citizens.61 Careful not to say that Section 1 confers a
generalized right to vote, Boutwell emphasized instead equality—
without regard to race—of citizenship rights. He argued:
[W]hen you prove to me that one man in the State of Kentucky
votes for President, or for a Representative in Congress, or for
members of the State Legislature, you have proved that every man
having like qualifications of education or property has the same
right. If you deny it to him you deny that to which by the
Constitution he is entitled: the enjoyment of equal privileges and
immunities as a citizen of the United States, and as a citizen of
Kentucky in the State of Kentucky.62

We’ll return in the next Section to the idea of equal rights. It is
enough for now to note Boutwell’s understanding of Section 1 and the
implications he saw for state regulation of the franchise. Opposition
in Congress to Boutwell’s claims about federal power repeated some
now-familiar arguments about voting, republicanism and the authority
of states. Charles Eldridge (Democrat of Wisconsin) argued that the
Guarantee Clause, even when fused with Fourteenth Amendment
equality, could not support the proposed bill because the implication
would be that no state today is republican—and that no state at the
Founding was either.63 In Eldridge’s view, the necessary implication of
how states have regulated—and still are regulating—the franchise is
that republicanism permits a range of state approaches on the issue of
who may vote.64 Eldridge argued also that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
61 Id. at 455.
62 Id. at 458.
63 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 638–58 (1869) (statement of Rep. Eldridge), as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 463, 470. Eldridge explained:
For Congress to intervene under the pretense that the States to which the bill is
to apply have not now a republican form of government is to decide that there
are no States now in the Union that have a republican form; for the bill applies
alike to all the States. It is to decide that there never have been any States of this
Union that have had a republican form. If there be any State that has a republican
form, that State ought to be excepted from its operation. I am not aware of any
one who has the hardihood to claim that the original States were not republican
in form, and if they were, that settles the question of the power of Congress to
interfere with them . . . .
Id.
64 Id. Eldridge argued:
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Amendment does not alter the power of states to limit the franchise
because, he said, “citizenship does not necessarily carry with it the right
to vote or hold office under our system.”65 Eldridge further invoked
the apportionment formula in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as confirmation of state power to regulate suffrage, free
from federal intervention.66 Aside from the text, Eldridge noted that
at the time Congress was considering the Fourteenth Amendment,
Thaddeus Stevens and other Republicans had made clear that the
Amendment would leave it “optional with the State to grant this right
of suffrage to its negroes or have its representation in Congress
proportionately diminished.”67 Still, there was no denying that with
the penalty provision of Section 2, states that chose to withhold the
franchise (from male citizens) would bear a cost.
4. A Note on the Fifteenth Amendment
Boutwell’s bill did not make it into law but ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment resolved the question of whether states may
limit voting rights on the basis of race. Yet even as it took an
amendment to specify that states may not, some observers held fast to
the view that republican government itself actually required equal
voting rights (at least without regard to race). On this account, the
The United States is not to guaranty any particular form of republican
government. The States certainly have the right to select or choose for themselves
the form, only so that it is republican. All are not by the Constitution required to
be Massachusetts. Ohio’s form may at least suit her people better, and the United
States has no power to dictate or guaranty the one or the other as a choice of
particular republican forms.
If it were claimed that no State is republican in form that does not allow all its
citizens to vote, then we should have no republican States, because no one of the
States does allows [sic] all its citizens to exercise this privilege. . . . Nor can the
denial to a citizen of the right to vote by a State destroy the republican form of its
government. It was not so understood at the adoption of the Constitution, and
has never been so claimed by any sane man. That the question of who shall
exercise the right of suffrage is a delicate and most important question I admit.
That the power of determining it ought to be dispassionately and wisely exercised
is equally true. On its being so used depends greatly the welfare and happiness
of the body-politic and the permanence and endurance of our republican
Government and institutions. But . . . this power rests in the States, and ought to
rest there . . . . [T]he rights and liberties of the people are safer with this power
in the control of the States than in the control of the Federal Government . . . .
Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 471. Section 2’s penalty provision, Eldridge said, “recognizes and expressly
admits the power to be in the State to abridge or deny the right to some of its inhabitants
to vote, subject only to have the basis of its representation reduced thereby.” Id.
67 Id.
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Fifteenth Amendment did not break new ground but was instead best
understood as perfecting a prior constitutional commitment. Georgia
Governor Rufus Bullock’s message, in March of 1869, urging his state’s
legislature to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment reflects this perspective.
Bullock said:
The equal right of every man, either by himself or his elected
representative, to participate in the framing of the laws by which he
is to be governed, and in the selection of the persons who are to
execute them, is the very foundation of republican government;
and, that one race or color shall undertake to exclude from
political privilege any other race or color is . . . a practical denial of
the principle on which our independence was originally declared,
and the government subsequently founded . . . .
The colored race is free all over this broad land. One more step
was needed, and this amendment, if adopted by three fourths of
the States represented in the Union, completes it. It will then be
written in the fundamental law, above the strike of faction, and
beyond the reach of passion, that all men, without distinction of
race or color, shall have equal political privileges.
....
The adoption of this amendment will, therefore, be hailed as
the final triumph of freedom and equal rights for all, and will blot
out forever all distinction in political rights, based upon race, color
or previous condition as to slavery. Its adoption by the nation will
be the consummation of the progress of the last eight years towards
a perfect accord between the theory of republicanism and its
practical enforcement.68

5. Summary
A commitment to republican government, as reflected in the
Republican Guarantee Clause, provided the framework for debates
that resulted, with the Fourteenth Amendment, in a change to the
Article I apportionment formula. During these debates, republicanism was universally understood as a foundational principle of the
original Constitution. Among those who supported an apportionment
amendment and those who opposed one, the shared view was that any
amendment had to be compatible with republican government. That
said, the particular meaning of republicanism generated divisions. In
one account, republicanism, as reflected in political arrangements at
the Founding era and during the antebellum period, means only a
general idea of popular sovereignty, one in which there are elections
68 Rufus Bullock, Governor of Ga., Governor’s Message (Mar. 10, 1869), in GA. HOUSE
J. 601 (1869), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 554, 555.
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for representatives but with states free to limit voting to certain
segments of the population. In a different account, exclusion of some
classes of citizens from the franchise is incompatible with
republicanism, understood to require rule by all, not some, of the
people. On this view, republicanism either took on a new meaning in
the Reconstruction era—such that past voting limitations would not be
permissible going forward—or, even at their time, historical voting
limits were inconsistent with the republican ideal (rather than
evidence of its meaning). Likewise, the penalty provision of Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment generated different understandings:
some viewed the provision to affirm a power of states to limit the
franchise (so long as they were willing to accept the penalty), while
others saw the provision as a recognition that class-based voting
restrictions were unlawful. Regardless of these points of division about
the details of republicanism and about the lessons to be drawn from
historical practices, there was no disagreement that republicanism
involved representation—and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment plainly meant that a state’s choice about how to allocate
voting rights impacted, in real numbers, the state’s representation in
Congress.
B. Rights
As the preceding discussion has shown, while the question of
apportionment raised the issue of voting rights, a more general idea
was in play: that republicanism involves equality of rights. As we have
already seen, commentators disagreed about whether voting was one
such right and, if it was, about the circumstances in which equality
could be displaced. But the shared understanding was that in a
republic there are rights that all citizens enjoy on equal terms. Debates
over Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrate this shared
understanding of republicanism as protecting equality of rights even
as the implications for voting specifically remained disputed.
Just as there were apportionment proposals prior to Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 also had predecessors. In the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, therefore, articulation of the relationship
between equal rights of citizens and republicanism predated
consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. In February 1866,
the House took up a proposed amendment providing that: “The
Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
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property.”69 These “privileges and immunities” were described in
terms of republican government and equality among citizens. For
example, Frederick Woodbridge (Republican of Vermont) depicted
the proposed amendment as “merely giv[ing] the power to Congress
to enact those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States the
natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship.”70 As such,
Woodbridge argued, the amendment was consistent with pre-existing
state power and would promote republican ends: it did not, in
Woodbridge’s view, “interfere[] with the sovereign power of a State
that adheres to a republican form of government” but instead would
“keep the States within their orbits, and . . . insure and secure forever
to every citizen of the United States the privileges and blessings of a
republican form of government.”71
When Congress took up the five-part proposed Fourteenth
Amendment in May of 1866, there was also an emphasis on equality of
rights as a foundational aspect of republicanism. John Farnsworth
(Republican of Illinois), for instance, described the “[e]qual
protection of the laws” (in Section 1) as “the very foundation of a
republican government.”72 In a republic, he reasoned, there must be
“equal rights of ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’”73 In the
Senate, Jacob Howard, introducing the amendment, likewise
emphasized equality of rights and its nexus with republicanism.
Howard said that the amendment
will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them from
passing laws trenching upon these fundamental rights and
privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all
persons who may happen to be within their jurisdiction. It
establishes equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the
poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights and the same
protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the most
wealthy, or the most haughty. That . . . is republican government,
as I understand it, and the only one which can claim the praise of a
just Government. Without this principle of equal justice to all men
and equal protection under the shield of the law, there is no
republican government and none that is really worth
maintaining.74

69 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1083, 1087–95 (1866), as reprinted in LASH, Vol.
2, supra note 3, at 108, 108–09.
70 Id. at 109 (statement of Rep. Woodbridge).
71 Id.
72 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2530–45 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Farnsworth), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 170, 175.
73 Id.
74 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–67 (1866) (statement of Rep. Howard),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 185, 189.
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Significantly, Howard’s description here looks both forward and
backward. The amendment, in his view, would accomplish something
new, by way of stopping—“forever disabling”—state governmental
violations of equal rights. But that new step would be in service of an
old, pre-existing commitment to republican government. In other
words, the cure is new, but the disease is not.
Other proponents of the amendment likewise argued that its
protections for equal rights broke no new ground because the Constitution always prohibited states—properly adhering to republican
principles—from denying equality of rights. Now, Congress, in Section
5, would gain specific power to enforce the prohibition. Thus,
Representative Bingham argued that the amendment would fill “a
want . . . in the Constitution,” one demonstrated by the Civil War
experience, of
the power in the people, the whole people of the United States, by
express authority of the Constitution . . . to protect by national law
the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and
the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever
the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts
of any State.75

Bingham emphasized that the proposed amendment did not alter the
pre-existing balance between federal and state power: in his view, the
amendment “takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it”
because “[n]o State ever had the right . . . to deny to any freeman the
equal protection of the laws or to abridge the privileges or immunities
of any citizen of the Republic” even as in the past states had “assumed
and exercised the power . . . without remedy.”76
Senator Luke Poland (Republican of Vermont) invoked textual
similarity to show that the Fourteenth Amendment merely enforced a
pre-exiting constitutional requirement. He argued that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of Section 1 “secures nothing beyond what was
intended by the original [privileges and immunities] provision in
[Article IV of] the Constitution.”77 What Section 1 does, Poland
explained, is it cures a problem: “the radical difference in the social
systems of the several States” and an excessive reliance on “State rights
or State sovereignty” to permit the “peculiar system of the South” (i.e.,
slavery) historically “led to a practical repudiation of the existing
provision” securing privileges and immunities, which was therefore

75 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2530–45 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 170, 178.
76 Id.
77 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2960–65 (1866) (statement of Sen. Poland), as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 3, at 202, 202.
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“disregarded in many of the States.”78 Because “no express power was
by the Constitution granted to Congress to enforce” that preexisting
protection for rights, Poland argued, “it became really a dead letter.”79
Now, with slavery ended, “Congress should be invested with the power
to enforce this provision throughout the country and compel its
observance.”80 In this view, the relevant development was allocation of
specific enforcement power to Congress in Section 5 of the
amendment.
So, too, according to Poland, Section 1’s due process and equal
protection provisions—coupled with the enforcement power of
Section 5—represented a proper return to foundational principles. In
particular, the amendment would make clear that republican
government means equality of rights and reinforce federal power to
secure such equality. Poland argued that a commitment to rights
equality is “the very spirit and inspiration of our system of government,
the absolute foundation upon which it was established” and that this
principle was “declared in the Declaration of Independence and in all
the provisions of the [original] Constitution.”81 Nonetheless, Poland
argued, “State laws exist, and some of them of very recent enactment,
in direct violation of these principles.”82 As Congress has endeavored
to “uproot and destroy all . . . partial State legislation” its own power
“has been doubted and denied.”83 According to Poland, adoption of
the proposed amendment would leave “no doubt . . . as to the power
of Congress to enforce principles lying at the very foundation of all
republican government if they be denied or violated by the States.”84
Again, it is a clarification of federal enforcement authority that is the
notable change.
To summarize, by the time that the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, there existed a general understanding that republicanism
required equal rights of citizenship. To be sure, there remained
debates about whether this principle extended to voting, and, if it did,
the circumstances in which states were free to displace it. Nonetheless,
the baseline approach was one of equality of rights among all citizens.
Departures from that principle—whether by carving out from it
certain categories of rights, or by adopting inequalities in rights that it
covered—were exceptions that required special justification.
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Id. at 202–03.
Id. at 203.
Id.
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INCORPORATION’S MEANING

Understanding the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the
Guarantee Clause has a series of potential implications. This Part
explores some of those implications. It sketches how incorporation
informs interpretations and applications of the rights-protecting
provisions of Section 1 and sheds light on enforcement mechanisms
and issues of justiciability. Finally, the Part offers a broader lesson for
discerning the meaning of the Reconstruction-era Amendments by
reference to the provisions of the original Constitution that (those
amendments notwithstanding) were preserved.
A. Equal Rights of Citizenship
Once incorporated, the Republican Guarantee Clause shapes and
informs the meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the rights it secures from state government infringement. Section 1,
therefore, should be understood with an eye to republicanism and the
status and role of citizens in a republican system. In other words, the
prohibitions on states abridging privileges or immunities, violating due
process, and denying equal protection of the laws are at their strongest
when they protect the citizenry of a republican state. This is not to say
that Section 1 is only about republican government or that the Section
1 protections only apply to citizens—some clearly do not—but to
suggest that the Section 1 rights take on special importance, and merit
special safeguards, when republican interests are at stake.
Indeed, the text of Section 1 itself, when read as a whole, sounds
in republican themes. This point is easily overlooked when individual
clauses, such as “due process” or “equal protection,” are plucked out
and analyzed separately. Section 1 begins with groups, not individuals,
and with groups specifically of citizens.85 The first sentence of Section
1 makes all persons born or naturalized in the United States citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.86 The second
sentence begins by barring states from abridging the privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizens.87 It is only in the next clauses that we arrive
at protections (of due process and equal protection of the laws) for
“any person”—individual, and not necessarily a citizen.88 The
ordering of Section 1 tells us that even as it provides individualized
safeguards, it also (and perhaps more importantly) secures some
collective interests of citizens in the republican state.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Understanding the core of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to be tied to and informed by republicanism has several
potential implications. One is to provide a framework for identifying
the particular rights that Section 1 secures. For example, when
provisions of the Bill of Rights are applied to state government, they
should be understood, in the first instance at least, in republican terms.
That is, application of the Bill of Rights makes most sense with respect
to its provisions that serve republicanism—and the core meaning of
those provisions, once applied to state government, should be
understood primarily for their republican-promoting ends. For
instance, First Amendment protections for speech, press, assembly,
and petitioning present easy cases for application to state government
because all of these things are key to the vitality of a republican system.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine republicanism existing without these
First Amendment protections. At the same time, an eye to republicanism can inform the more precise nature and scope of
incorporated First Amendment rights. For example, government
restrictions on the gathering of a political party would more obviously
violate the right of assembly than would, say, a restriction imposed
upon a sporting event or other activity disconnected from republican
government.
A vast literature has explored the ways in which the meaning of
Bill of Rights provisions should be understood, once applied to the
states, to have shifted from federalism safeguards to protecting
individual rights.89 Attention to the Republican Guarantee Clause
suggests a different orientation, in which even as rights protect
individuals from state infringement, they are understood to serve
also—and perhaps principally—republican ends and the interests of
the citizenry as a collective group. In this regard, modern reliance on
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as the vehicle for
applying the Bill of Rights to the states rather than on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause—textually and historically the better choice—
obscures the republican theme. The Privileges or Immunities Clause,
recall, has a collectivist and citizenry-oriented element, while the Due
Process Clause speaks of individuals. When the Due Process Clause is
the provision by which the Bill of Rights is applied to the states, it is
natural to think in terms of individualized protections. Importantly,
application of the Bill of Rights via the Privileges or Immunities Clause
need not mean that those rights would protect only citizens and only
in a collectivist manner. But the approach would provide a grounding

89 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998).
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and context for rights applied to the states in a way that has been lost
with the shift to the Due Process Clause.
Understanding the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the
Republican Guarantee Clause also puts center stage the concept of
equal rights, particularly equal rights of citizens, that was dominant in
the debates that led to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Equal Protection Clause, of course, prohibits states from denying
any person in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The
gloss of the Guarantee Clause points to the more specific concern of
equality in the rights of citizens. On this account, state governmental
action that draws classes of citizens and gives some of them rights that
it withholds from others (or gives some of them stronger rights than it
gives to others) should be viewed with skepticism. The problem is
especially severe when those inequalities interfere with the ability of
some classes of citizens to participate in the life of the Republic. Under
the original Constitution, republicanism could co-exist, if uneasily,
with state government exclusion of classes of individuals from the
political community. Once the Guarantee Clause is incorporated,
however, states should be deemed to have far less leeway to confer
unequal political status on groups of citizens.
An obvious question is the one that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment themselves repeatedly grappled with: how about state
restrictions on voting? Here, it turns out, the Supreme Court has likely
landed on the right spot. Rather than read into the Constitution a
free-standing right of all citizens to vote, in a series of cases the Court
has imposed equality requirements on state regulation of voting. In
other words, state voting regulations that treat some classes of citizens
differently from others trigger strict scrutiny.90 As the Court has
explained:
[S]tatutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of
our representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in
determining who may participate in political affairs or in the
selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of
representative government.
. . . Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective
basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective
voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their
lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote
to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and
90 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating
on equal protection grounds state law that limited voting in district school board elections
to individuals who owned or leased property in the district or had children attending school
in the district); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating state poll
tax on equal protection grounds).
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denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state
interest.91

This approach, centered not on an individualized right to vote but
on equal status in the political community, reflects a republican idea.
The approach is also in harmony with the voting amendments ratified
after the Fourteenth Amendment, themselves framed in terms of
equality: of race (the Fifteenth), of sex (the Nineteenth), of wealth
(the Twenty-Fourth), and of age (the Twenty-Sixth).92
B. Enforcement and Justiciability
Incorporation of the Guarantee Clause has implications also for
the role of the federal government in safeguarding rights. Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress power to “enforce, by
appropriate legislation” the prohibitions on state governmental
conduct contained in Section 1.93 Standing alone, this Section 5 power
is discretionary: Section 5 does not require Congress to enact laws to
protect Section 1 rights. The assessment changes, however, once rights
protected by Section 1 are tied to the Guarantee Clause because that
Clause creates a federal obligation. Incorporation of the Guarantee
Clause would thus mean that to the extent that Section 1 rights secure
and promote republican government, the federal government must
act to protect those rights from state interference. Under this account,
for example, the federal government is obligated to take steps to
ensure that states do not interfere with political speech, with equality
of citizenship, or with other rights that are at the foundation of a
republican system. Incorporation of the Guarantee Clause points also
to a particular role for Congress in protecting republican-oriented
rights. Article IV imposes its obligation upon “the United States,” and
thus arguably upon each of the three federal branches. Once Article
IV is read in conjunction with Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is reasonable to conclude that, with respect to
guaranteeing rights, Congress has the lead role—even as, consistent
with Article IV, the other branches of the federal government may have
roles to play as well.

91 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626–27 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
92 An equal-rights approach might also explain why it is permissible for states to bar
minor citizens (under the age of eighteen) from voting. In one sense, the bar denies minors
a citizenship right enjoyed by other (adult) citizens. But in another sense, the bar involves
a form of equality: adults today could not vote when they were children and the children of
today will, within a fixed time, exercise the franchise.
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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Incorporation also alters the common assessment that Guarantee
Clause claims present nonjusticiable political questions. Courts
routinely invoke the Supreme Court’s 1849 decision in Luther v.
Borden94 as establishing that claims under the Guarantee Clause are
nonjusticiable.95 But a close reading of Luther shows that it did nothing
of the kind. Luther involved a trespass claim following the Dorr
Rebellion in which a group of Rhode Island citizens had rebelled and
claimed to be the legitimate government of the state—in place of the
government established under the royal charter.96 After the charter
government had declared a state of emergency and dispatched the
militia to quell the insurrection, militiaman Luther Borden broke into
the home of Martin Luther, a leader of the rebellion, to arrest him for
his participation in the rebellion.97 When Luther sued Borden for
trespass, Borden asserted that he had acted on behalf of the charter
government and its establishment of martial law.98 At issue in the case,
therefore, was the question of whether the charter government had
acted legitimately in imposing martial law, a question that required
asking also whether the charter government was indeed the lawful
government of Rhode Island.99 In his opinion for the Court, Chief
Justice Taney said that the question of which government was the
legitimate government of a state was “to be settled by the political
power” and that “when that power has decided, the courts are bound
to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.”100 In looking, then, to
the determinations of the political branches, Taney said first that

94 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
95 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79–80 (1930)
(“As to the guaranty to every State of a republican form of government . . . it is well settled
that the questions arising under it are political, not judicial, in character and thus are for
the consideration of the Congress and not the courts.”) (citations omitted); Hanson v.
Wyatt, 552 F.3d 1148, 1163 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The seminal Supreme Court decision under
the political-question doctrine was a Guarantee Clause case, Luther v. Borden.”); Hawai’i v.
Trump, No. 19-00597, 2020 WL 7409591, at *3 (D. Haw. Dec. 17, 2020) (“The ‘classic’
political question case, Luther v. Borden, . . . addressed claims under the Guarantee Clause
of the Constitution, where two rival governments disputed which was the lawful government
of Rhode Island.”). But see Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 635 n.5 (6th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion)) (writing that
“[p]erhaps it is time for the Supreme Court to reconsider its Guarantee Clause
jurisprudence” and observing that “[o]ver the following century, . . . [the] limited holding
[of Luther] metamorphosed into the sweeping assertion that ‘[v]iolation of the great
guaranty of a republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the
courts’”).
96 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 34–35.
97 See id. at 35–36.
98 Id. at 35.
99 See id. at 37–39.
100 Id. at 47.
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Congress had not resolved the competing claims because the Dorr
faction had never sought to send to Congress a rival slate of
representatives such that Congress would have to choose between
them and the representatives sent by the charter government.101 Taney
next looked to the President and concluded that by signaling a
willingness to send militia troops to Rhode Island at the request of the
charter government, the President had recognized the charter
government (rather than that of the Dorr faction) as legitimate.102
This determination by the President was binding on the courts.103
Taney then proceeded to hold that the declaration of martial law was
valid104 and to affirm the lower court’s decision in favor of the
defendant.105 Understandings of Luther as establishing the nonjusticiability of Guarantee Clause claims trace to two paragraphs of dicta—
and a misreading of them—in Taney’s opinion.106 Luther did not hold
and Taney did not even suggest that courts could not hear and decide
Guarantee Clause claims. Indeed, only in the early twentieth century
did the Supreme Court (relying on Luther) hold that Guarantee Clause

101 Id. at 42.
102 Id. at 44.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 46.
105 Id. at 46–47.
106 Id. at 42. Here is what Taney wrote:
The fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States
provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a
republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion;
and on the application of the legislature or of the executive (when the legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic violence.
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what
government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee
to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what
government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is
republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are
admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under
which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the
proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other
department of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial
tribunal. It is true that the contest in this case did not last long enough to bring
the matter to this issue; and as no senators or representatives were elected under
the authority of the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, Congress was
not called upon to decide the controversy. Yet the right to decide is placed there,
and not in the courts.
Id. It doesn’t take much to see why the modern take on Luther is wrong: the fact (as stated
in the above paragraph in what is plainly dicta) that Congress, by admitting members,
determines that a state government is legitimate and republican and that that
determination is then binding on courts is far removed from the more general proposition
that Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable political questions.
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claims present nonjusticiable questions to be resolved solely by the
political branches107 and more recent cases have suggested (without
elaboration) that some Guarantee Clause claims are indeed
justiciable.108 In any event, even if Luther is understood as a political
question case, its reach is properly cabined. Once the Guarantee
Clause, as incorporated, is understood to serve the interests of citizens
(rather than states) and to define and protect rights (rather than
political institutions), application of the political question doctrine
makes far less sense. Adjudication of rights-based claims is the regular
business of courts. In other words, the political question doctrine may
have made sense when the paradigm question was which government
of a state is legitimate, but it makes far less sense if the paradigm cases
involve say, abridgement of political speech or other rights that courts
are well-positioned to decide.
C. Preservation
A further implication of an incorporated Guarantee Clause
concerns more generally the way to understand the Reconstruction
Amendments. Reconstruction was a point of profound constitutional
change. Yet, as the role of the Guarantee Clause shows, constitutional
change was accompanied by elements of constitutional preservation.
To a significant degree, the Reconstruction-era Amendments must,
therefore, be understood in terms of continuity and clarification—
rather than as rupture.
The Reconstruction Amendments are, importantly, amendments.
They are attached to the existing document. They therefore work (and
must work) in harmony with the existing Constitution even as they
impose change upon it. But to focus on change is to miss a good part
of the story. It is impossible to understand Reconstruction without
close attention to what was not reconstructed but was instead preserved.
107 See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912) (dismissing
challenge to state adoption of initiative and referendum amendments as inconsistent with
republican government because the “issues presented, in their very essence, are, and have
long since by this court been, definitely determined to be political and governmental, and
embraced within the scope of the powers conferred upon Congress, and not, therefore,
within the reach of judicial power, it follows that the case presented is not within our
jurisdiction”).
108 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184–85 (1992) (“In a group of cases
decided before the holding of Luther was elevated into a general rule of nonjusticiability,
the Court addressed the merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause without any
suggestion that the claims were not justiciable. . . . More recently, the Court has suggested
that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political
questions. . . . We need not resolve this difficult question today.” (citations omitted));
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) (“[S]ome questions raised under the Guaranty
Clause are nonjusticiable.”).
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Federalism was preserved. The jurisdictional boundaries of the states
were preserved. With the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress
obtained new powers (principally of enforcement), but its powers
remain limited to those enumerated; the Tenth Amendment is still in
place, unchanged. The federal executive branch was retained,
unaltered. Because the three Reconstruction Amendments foretell
new kinds of cases and controversies, the work of federal courts
expands but their role also continues circumscribed. The Fourteenth
Amendment overturned Dred Scott but there was no sweeping away of
all the decisions of the antebellum Supreme Court so as to start
constitutional interpretation anew. Depictions of Reconstruction as a
second Founding109 obscure the extent to which it involved retention
and fortification of the old structure.
Textually, the words of the Reconstruction Amendments track,
echo and draw upon the words of the original Constitution in
important and influential respects. The “[n]o State shall” language of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment repeats that of Article I,
Section 10.110 Both provisions limit what states can do—thereby
reinforcing a commitment to presumptive and general state power
except where power is denied. That Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, like its Article I predecessor, is framed in the negative—
no state shall—means also there is no obligation on the part of the states
to act; so long as the state does not do what is prohibited, the
Constitution is satisfied. The “shall not” language of Section 1 of the
Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment
follow the exact same approach: they impose prohibitions on action,
not obligations to act.111
The “Congress shall have power to” language of Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment, of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and of Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment echoes Article I, Section
8.112 As a result of the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress, therefore, gains additional powers that—as is true of the Article I powers—
Congress can exercise if it chooses. But there is no obligation to
exercise the power. Congress thus need not “enforce, by appropriate
legislation,” the substantive provisions of the Reconstruction
Amendments—any more than Congress is required (under Article I)
to regulate commerce among the states, coin money, or establish post
offices.113 To underscore the point, the “no state shall” language of
109 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019).
110 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. art. I, § 10.
111 Id. amend. XIII, § 1; id. amend. XV, § 1.
112 Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. art. I, § 8.
113 Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
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the Fourteenth Amendment is not mirrored by “and Congress shall
enforce” the designated prohibitions on state action. Textually, at
least (and viewed apart from the account of the incorporated
Guarantee Clause), the arrangement leaves an enforcement gap.
Consistent with the design of the original Constitution, the
Reconstruction Amendments appear to impose no affirmative
obligation upon any governmental entity to take action to ensure that
the new legal rights—privileges and immunities, due process, and
equal protection—are safeguarded.
In other ways, too, the choice to amend rather than replace the
original Constitution has important implications for the shape and
scope of the Reconstruction Amendments. The three Amendments
arrive not as a single package but as a sequence over a period of five
years. This, too, produces some significant effects. The Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolishes slavery and involuntary servitude,
contains an “except” clause: involuntary servitude (at least)114 may exist
as punishment for crime. (Convict leasing in the southern states after
the Civil War manifested this authority.)115 Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which sets the new basis for congressional
apportionment, also contains an except-for-crime provision.116 As we
have seen, Section 2 provides for apportionment based on a state’s
entire population (“excluding Indians not taxed”) and that if the right
of adult male citizens to vote is “denied . . . or in any way abridged” the
state’s representation is reduced proportionately—but that penalty
does not apply if the denial or abridgement is for “participation in
rebellion, or other crime.”117 Layered as it is on top of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s crime exception links the
114 Some interpreters view the ban on slavery as also subject to a criminal punishment
exception. Here for example, is what the Virginia Supreme Court wrote six years after
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment about a felon hired out to work on the
Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad:
[D]uring his term of service in the penitentiary, . . . [a convicted felon] is in a
state of penal servitude to the State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in
its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State. He
is civiliter mortuus . . . .
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society of
freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men have some
rights it is true, such as the law in its benignity accords to them, but not the rights
of freemen. They are the slaves of the State undergoing punishment for heinous
crimes committed against the laws of the land.
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
115 See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008).
116 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
117 Id.
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criminal system with voting rights in a way that incentivizes states to
expand criminal punishment as a basis for (besides generating a supply
of labor) denying the franchise to disfavored segments of the
population. Section 1’s grand “no State shall” language can easily
obscure Section 2’s loophole—a “but states may” clause—for denying
voting rights by gearing up the criminal justice system.118
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment must also be understood
in terms of what it is amending. We have already seen that Section 2
amends the original apportionment formula of Article I, by which
three-fifths of a state’s slave population was counted. Article I gave
slave states an incentive to increase the number of slaves within the
state and ensure they were accurately counted so as to collect extra
seats in the House. There was, thus, a built-in accounting mechanism.
Although Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
promote rights and equality, it lacks a comparable mechanism.
Individual states have little incentive to report back on the numbers of
their own (male) citizens prohibited from voting because of a criminal
conviction (and no incentive at all if the prohibition is for another
reason). Monitoring by sister states is not a reliable mechanism if all
states limit voting in one way or another, view regulation of voting as
an important attribute of state sovereignty, or lack information about
voting practices elsewhere. Federal oversight is the obvious alternative.
Congress has its Section 5 enforcement power, but Section 5 itself
appears a discretionary provision. Section 2, by contrast, says that “the
basis of representation . . . shall be reduced.”119 That certainly sounds
like an obligation. But Section 2 does not specify who is responsible for
determining that a state has impermissibly denied or abridged the
right to vote and for ensuring imposition of the accompanying penalty.
One answer returns to Section 5 and Congress. This Article has
pointed to the Guarantee Clause, with its obligation of action, as
holding the enforcement key.
Just as the Fourteenth Amendment echoes and builds upon the
Thirteenth, so does the Fifteenth Amendment with respect to the
Fourteenth. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment contains the same
“denied . . . or abridged” language of the Fourteenth Amendment.120
And, while the Fifteenth outright bars denying or abridging voting “on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,”121 it, too,
invites states to find alternative grounds on which to limit or deny the
franchise. Further, the Fifteenth Amendment represents a doublingdown on the except-for-crime incentive of Section 2 of the Fourteenth,
118
119
120
121

Id. §§ 1, 2.
Id. § 2.
Id.
Id. amend. XV, § 1.
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which remains in place (with no penalty in representation), unaffected
by the Fifteenth Amendment ban. Moreover, read together, the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments might well be understood as
permitting states to deny the right (of adult men) to vote for reasons
other than race or crime so long as the state is willing to assume the
accompanying penalty in representation. Finally, the Fifteenth
Amendment also has no guaranteed enforcement mechanism: as with
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Fifteenth
Amendment gives Congress power—discretionary authority—to
enforce the Section 1 prohibition.
Tying these points together leads to some sobering conclusions.
A person who knew nothing about Reconstruction and sought to
understand it from the three amendments to the Constitution would
likely conclude that change had been modest. In many nations, where
a civil war ends, a new constitution begins. After the American Civil
War, however, constitutional change took the form of three—and just
three—constitutional amendments. That itself is quite remarkable.
Even more striking (in light of the causes of the Civil War) is what
would seem limited attention within those three amendments to issues
of race. The Thirteenth Amendment eliminates slavery. The Fifteenth
Amendment bars denying voting rights to adult males on the basis of
their race. These are important changes. But that is all the three
amendments have to say about race specifically. The Fourteenth
Amendment, the longest of the three, says nothing, anywhere, about
race. Our otherwise uninformed observer might well conclude that as
to race, the end of slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment and the
protection for voting in the Fifteenth Amendment are as far as
Reconstruction goes.
Yet the change produced by the Reconstruction Amendments
cannot be fully understood by reading those amendments in isolation,
nor by identifying the existing constitutional provisions they alter or
repeal, nor even by tracing how they echo terms and approaches
contained in the amended document. Understanding the full nature
and scope of the change that occurred with the Reconstruction
Amendments requires reading the entire Constitution with fresh eyes—
with the addition of, and in light of, the three amendments made. The
discussion in this Article of the Guarantee Clause’s relationship to the
Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that a full accounting of what
Reconstruction produced requires attention to elements of the
Constitution preserved and, in particular, given new and important
meaning.
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PLESSY REVISITED

An incorporated account of the Republican Guarantee Clause
invites a fresh look at early court decisions involving claims under the
Reconstruction Amendments. This final Part of the Article revisits
Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the Supreme Court rejected challenges
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to an 1890
Louisiana statute requiring “equal but separate” railroad cars for white
and non-white passengers.122
Plessy, today, is widely disparaged and Justice Harlan’s solitary
dissent in the case has carried the day. Harlan’s dissent is regularly
quoted for its unflinching insistence, in paragraph after paragraph,
that, with the addition of the Reconstruction Amendments, the
Constitution bars government from treating individuals differently,
indeed from treating them at all, on the basis of their race.123 “Our
constitution,” Harlan thus famously said, “is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”124
Harlan’s concluding paragraph in his Plessy dissent has received
less attention than other portions of his opinion, but it might well
contain the key to understanding Harlan’s approach. Here is what
Harlan wrote at the end of his dissent:
I am of opinion that the statute of Louisiana is inconsistent with
the personal liberty of citizens, white and black, in that state, and
hostile to both the spirit and letter of the constitution of the United
States. If laws of like character should be enacted in the several
states of the Union, the effect would be in the highest degree
mischievous. Slavery, as an institution tolerated by law, would, it is
true, have disappeared from our country; but there would remain
a power in the states, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full
enjoyment of the blessings of freedom, to regulate civil rights,
common to all citizens, upon the basis of race, and to place in a
condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now
constituting a part of the political community, called the “People
of the United States,” for whom, and by whom through
representatives, our government is administered. Such a system is
122 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540, 552 (1896).
123 See id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In respect of civil rights, common to all
citizens, the constitution of the United States does not . . . permit any public authority to
know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights.”); id. at 563
(arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments “obliterated the race line from our systems
of governments, national and state, and placed our free institutions upon the broad and
sure foundation of the equality of all men before the law”); id. at 562 (“The arbitrary
separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of
servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law
established by the constitution.”).
124 Id. at 559.

1472

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:4

inconsistent with the guaranty given by the constitution to each
state of a republican form of government, and may be stricken
down by congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of
their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land,
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.125

In this final, rich paragraph, Harlan explicitly ties the
Reconstruction Amendments—and his assessment of the Louisiana
railway law under them—to the Republican Guarantee Clause of
Article IV. It is worth parsing the words of the paragraph carefully. In
Harlan’s account, equality of rights—equal liberty—protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment is an essential condition of Republican
government. Laws, and particularly laws drawn on racial lines, that
interfere with equal rights do more than injure those they designate
and treat as unequal. By negating the equal status of members of the
“political community,”126 such laws are “hostile” to the Constitution
itself and thus undermine the “personal liberty of [all] citizens, white
and black.”127 The “system[ic]” effect of laws imposing inequality is
therefore to undermine the “republican form of government” that
serves the interests of the People as a whole.128 In this approach, the
Equal Protection Clause serves distinctly republican ends. Harlan also
depicts citizenship as reinforcing the relationship between the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment makes individuals born or naturalized in the
United States simultaneously citizens of the United States and of their
state of residence. These citizens, in Harlan’s view, enjoy equal rights
under the Constitution; equality of citizenry is itself a hallmark of
republican government.
Harlan sees also that the relationship between the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Republican Guarantee Clause has important
implications for enforcement of rights. As discussed already, Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment bars states from “deny[ing] to any
person within [their] jurisdiction[s] the equal protection of the laws”
and Section 5 says Congress “shall have power to enforce” the
prohibition “by appropriate legislation.”129 But as to enforcement, the
Republican Guarantee Clause is different. It speaks not in power but
in obligation: the United States shall guarantee government of
republican form. Harlan recognized this point—and thus viewed the
majority in Plessy as having failed to perform a constitutional duty.
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 563–64.
Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 564.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §§ 1, 5.
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Congress, Harlan explains, can respond to violations of equal
protection—Section 5 makes that clear—and in so doing promote
republican government. But Harlan insists also that the courts can and
must respond when (as in Plessy) they are asked to do so.130 In his
discussion of the Guarantee Clause, Harlan makes no mention of
Luther. One obvious explanation is that in contrast to readers today,
Harlan did not understand Luther to render Guarantee Clause claims
nonjusticiable. Or, if he did, perhaps he viewed the Reconstruction
Amendments to have altered the Luther landscape. Harlan frames
judicial power as the “solemn duty” of “the courts” “to maintain the
supreme law of the land.”131 That approach bypasses Guarantee Clause
justiciability issues by pivoting to the Supremacy Clause—which
encompasses, as “supreme Law,”132 the Reconstruction Amendments,
and arguably provides separate grounds for judicial intervention. If
the Supremacy Clause imposes an obligation to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause, the lack of justiciability under the Guarantee Clause
is no barrier.
Readers might discern in this depiction a sleight of hand. Look
closely: Harlan writes of the duty of “the courts”133 but under the
Supremacy Clause, it is state (not federal) judges who are “bound
thereby,” and it is in reference to state (not federal) judges that the
phrase (a source of Harlan’s duty), “any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding,” appears.134 Federal
judges, like those on state courts, and like all federal and state governmental officials, do take an oath to “support this Constitution”135; like
all governmental personnel, federal judges are also, of course, bound
by the Supremacy Clause just as they are bound by other provisions of
the Constitution. But the Supremacy Clause itself makes no mention
of federal courts.
Perhaps, then, Harlan is making loose use of text to support his
argument for the Supreme Court to invalidate the Louisiana law.
There is, however, another explanation. Perhaps Harlan did have
Luther in mind all along. When Harlan says “the courts” can and
should act, he might himself be referring to the state courts. On this
reading, even if Luther, a case that began in federal court, precludes
federal judges from adjudicating Guarantee Clause claims, it should
not be read to impose that same justiciability restriction upon the state
courts—nor even upon the Supreme Court in reviewing state court
130
131
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See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 564.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 564.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
Id.
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rulings, in cases like Plessy, which arrive by writ of error.136 On this
account, in upholding the segregation law, the Louisiana Supreme
Court failed to correct an impediment to republican government.
Once that happened, Harlan tells us, the Court was obligated to
reverse the decision.
While Harlan’s Plessy dissent offers some intriguing insights,
Harlan himself does not get all the credit for linking, in the case, the
Reconstruction Amendments to the Republican Guarantee Clause.
Harlan’s invocations of the Guarantee Clause tracked arguments made
in Plessy’s briefs to the Supreme Court. The briefs did not refer
specifically to the Guarantee Clause but the arguments they offer are
very much grounded in ideas of republicanism, citizenship, and
equality, and in a claim of obligatory federal action to protect rights.

136 Harlan’s fusion of the Guarantee Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis
for judicial intervention appears in other opinions as well. One example is Harlan’s
dissenting opinion in Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900), in which the Court dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction a petition by candidates for governor and lieutenant governor in
Kentucky seeking review of a state court decision in an election dispute. The case involved
a ruling by the state board of elections, later adopted by the state legislature, that the
candidates’ opponents had received more votes in the election and were to be installed in
office. See id. at 549–51. The petitioners asserted that they had actually won the election
and that the action of the board and the legislature deprived them of property—the right
to hold elected office—without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and violated also the Guarantee Clause by interfering with the ability of
Kentucky voters to choose their representatives. Id. at 573–74. The Court rejected the
petitioners’ argument that holding elected office was a Fourteenth Amendment right of
property. See id. at 577–78, 580. Thus, the state court decision (also refusing the petitioners
relief) had worked no denial of a constitutional right that could be a basis for jurisdiction
under Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat.
73, 85–87 (granting certain Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over states’ highest
courts). The Court also rejected review on the basis of the Republican Guarantee Clause.
See id. at 578–80. Harlan, dissenting, reasoned that the linkage between Fourteenth
Amendment liberty and the Guarantee Clause required the Court to review the state court
ruling. He wrote:
What more directly involves the liberty of the citizen than to be able to enter upon
the discharge of the duties of an office to which he has been lawfully elected by
his fellow citizens? . . . The liberty of which I am speaking is that which exists, and
which can exist, only under a republican form of government. “The United
States,” the supreme law of the land declares, “shall guarantee to every state in
this Union a republican form of government.” And “the distinguishing feature
of that form,” this court has said, “is the right of the people to choose their own
officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the
legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be
said to be those of the people themselves.” But of what value is that right if the
person selected by the people at the polls for an office provided for by the
Constitution . . . may be deprived of that office by the arbitrary action of the
legislature proceeding altogether without evidence?
Id. at 603–05 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891)).
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Plessy’s lawyers argued, for instance, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause “is a guaranty . . . of equality of right . . . and
the free enjoyment of all public privileges.”137 They urged that “assortment
of citizens by race in the enjoyment of public privileges . . . is . . . an
interference with the personal liberty of the individual as is impossible
to be made consistently with his rights as an equal citizen of the United
States and of the State in which he resides.”138 This equality of rights,
Plessy’s brief stated, “look[s] to national power for its preservation.”139
All citizens, the brief argued, had an interest in countering racially
discriminatory laws: “[I]t is as much a constitutional privilege and duty of a
White citizen to resist any attempt to make him an instrument for enforcing
such legal inequality as it is for a Colored citizen to resist being made a victim
thereof. The constitutional liberty of the party so acted upon is as much
offended in the first case as in the second.”140 State designation of an
individual as being “of either a superior or an inferior class of citizens,”
the brief said, is “injury to any citizen of the United States.”141 Thus,
echoing the language of the Guarantee Clause, Plessy’s brief insisted
that “[a] law assorting the citizens of a State in the enjoyment of a
public franchise on the basis of race, is obnoxious to the spirit of
republican institutions,”142 and “the United States cannot allow the
matter of the Color of its citizens to become a ground of legal
disparagement, or legal offense within the States, unless with a
disparagement of itself.”143
It is all there: the fusion of the Guarantee Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment; the requirement of equal rights of
citizenship; the relationship between such rights and republican
government; and the duty of the federal government to intervene to
protect rights and preserve republicanism.
CONCLUSION
In making a case for understanding the Fourteenth Amendment
to incorporate the Republican Guarantee Clause and in identifying
some implications of the claim, this Article aims to inspire rather than
foreclose future analysis and debate. The Article itself is necessarily
limited: in the historical record it develops (the Article relies largely
137 Brief of Plaintiff in Error by Walker at 11, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(No. 210).
138 Id.
139 Id. at 12.
140 Brief of Plaintiff in Error by Phillips & McKenney at 6, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896) (No. 210).
141 Id. at 12.
142 Brief of Plaintiff in Error by Walker, supra note 137, at 14.
143 Brief of Plaintiff in Error by Phillips & McKenney, supra note 140, at 15.
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on congressional debates, leaving (for now) most other sources
untapped), and in its analysis of the implications that flow. Perhaps
the Article best succeeds in laying some groundwork for future work.
Such work could, for example, usefully examine the role notions of
republican government played in state-level debates over the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the context of
readmission of the Confederate states to the Union and the adoption
of the Reconstruction Acts, in the passage of other landmark federal
legislation (such as the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act and the 1875 Civil Rights
Act), and in state laws and practices implicating rights and
representation. There is also very likely great value in tracing the
meaning of republicanism—and its evolution—in the popular press
and other non-governmental sources, and particularly in examining
perspectives on the relationship between republican government and
the Reconstruction-era Amendments. Other work could helpfully seek
to pin down specific implications for the meaning and scope of rights
and the obligation of the federal government to protect them.
Notably, a settlement on the idea that republican government requires
equality of citizenship still leaves to be worked out many details about
which rights deserve protection, and how those protections are best
secured. Using an incorporated account to revisit past court decisions
involving the Fourteenth Amendment and the Republican Guarantee
Clause, to evaluate current constitutional claims or to bring future
constitutional challenges, will likewise require additional historical
research and sustained reflection on the contemporary implications of
what that research yields.

